Comparing port strikes: Hong Kong vs. Shenzhen, 2013

Comparing port strikes: Hong Kong vs. Shenzhen, 2013

Image by Lam Yik Fei/Getty Images.

Translation by Wv from《深圳盐田港罢工与香港葵涌码头罢工的差异与思考》(Thoughts on the differences between the Shenzhen Yantian and Hong Kong Kwai Tsing Port Strikes) by 秋火(Autumn Fire), from  工革斗研的博客, September 9, 2013. Although this is over two years old, both logistics in general and these strikes in particular are currently being revisited as key objects of investigation in certain circles (see, for example,《碼頭罷⼯⼀周年:鎂光燈後,還剩甚麼》), and this article provides information missing from existing English accounts of both strikes.1 Other pieces on logistics struggles are in the works. The original Chinese is pasted below the translation for archival purposes.2


Not long ago (9 September 2013), 800 tower and gantry crane operators at Yantian Port in Shenzhen launched a strike to demand wage increase. In just two days, they managed to obtain an increase of 1,700 RMB (30%). Many commentators compared this victorious result with the defeat of the 40 day strike at Hong Kong’s Kwai Tsing port, which obtained only a 9.8% wage increase, a far cry from the initial request of 23% (popularly conceived as “Yantian Victorious, Hong Kong ineffectual”). Like Yantian, Kwai Tsing port is operated by Hongkong International Terminals (HIT), a subsidiary of tycoon Li Ka-Shing’s Hutchinson Whampoa Limited (HWL). Commentators lauded the higher quality of resistance conducted by mainland workers, or urged the introspection of their Hong Kong counterparts. The comparison is charged with symbolism. Given the politically sensitive atmosphere, this naturally attracts attention; various imaginative and grandiose readings are easy to make. But from the perspective of labour struggles, the differences between the two strikes are more interesting and worthwhile for the world of labour to mull over.

However, it is important to note the basic difference between the two port strikes: the Hong Kong port strike had at most 400-450 subcontracted workers participating (whom HIT considers “non-core positions”), which (likely) meant that they were much more replaceable; the Yantian port strike that happened six months later consisted of 800 direct employees, most of which had been employed for more than ten years and formed the bulk of Shenzhen Yantian Port Group’s main labour force. As the strikers were of different statuses, a more sophisticated comparison is required.

In summary, the two port strikes have big differences. They can be broken down as follows:

Firstly, Yantian port workers began rallying among themselves, within 24 hours, news spread quickly within and brought 800 workers to strike, bringing all container shipping operations to a stop. Their opening pay raise demand of 3,000 RMB (a whopping increase of 60%) was earth-shattering; the scale and impact of their collective action was far greater than the Kwai Tsing strike that began on March 28 with 200 unionised subcontracted workers (some sources say 150) which expanded to about 300 the following day. In comparison, the Yantian strike’s spontaneity and numbers delivered a heavier punch, and was difficult to defend and prevent (from the point of view of the capitalists). This is characteristic of labour actions in mainland China.

The crux: the Kwai Tsing strike did not manage to paralyse port operations. Workers managed only to stop work at berth 6 and later, after April 1, retreated to the road outside the gate. Throughout the strike, their numbers hovered between 300 and 450. This is a result of the shortcomings with the reformism of mainstream unions in Hong Kong: the unions do not attempt to involve broader participation from workers to build a mass movement. Instead, they are fragmented with competing interests (port workers separately belong to 3 major unions).

Secondly, as a result of long-term differences in class pressures and socio-political conditions in the two regions, the different attitudes of the ruling classes in Shenzhen and Hong Kong produced very different responses.

At Kwai Tsing Container Terminals, under the dominion of Li, the management was uncompromising and ignored the worker protests for over ten days. The SAR Government Labour Department was also clearly partisan towards the port management. As the protest became drawn out, pressure from media and public opinion forced the government to broker talks.

The dominance and arrogance of the capitalist class and the SAR government originates from Hong Kong’s role as bridgehead for the revitalisation of capitalism in mainland China for the past two to three decades. This provided huge capital boosts, as well as a massive supply of low-wage labour approved by

the authoritarian Chinese state that repressed wage demands from Hong Kong workers. At the same time, large labour-intensive industries migrated overseas; workers from logistics, transportation, construction and service industries were brought under the discipline of outsourcing and became fragmented. The labour movement languished for many years.

The Hong Kong capitalist class which Li Ka-Shing represents is similarly domineering at Yantian. However, Yantian is not entirely under the sole control of Li – it is co-managed by HWL and the state bureaucracy. The former has a share ownership of 65% and assumes primary control. The mainland side of the partnership have complained(?): when Yantian port workers were on strike in April 2007, HWL was passive in response, forcing mainland parties (comprising of state and semi-official organisations such as unions) to intervene. After 2007, the mainland state partners consequently obtained concrete authority to mediate capital-labour relations. The politics of“social construction”led by Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang in 2011 brought“collective negotiation”to the fore once again and the Yantian strike in 2007 became cited as a pioneer case of capital-labour relations under“social reconstruction”. Clearly then, the Chinese state has been more proactive than the Hong Kong capitalists in dealing with labour protests. The strike this time ended in compromise in just two days, even shorter than the previous one (three days).

Despite Li’s control over both ports, why was the response in Hong Kong hardline while Yantian port was left to Chinese state partners who gave away larger concessions to workers? Yantian is an important international port (its cargo tonnage is highest in China) and a strike there damages the international political image of the government. What’s more, under the strain of China’s pressure cooker environment that is on the verge of explosion, a strike at a pivotal location could be contagious with unpredictable consequences. It may incite other workers along the coastline to action, producing a chain reaction that threatens to escalate into a widespread coastal labour movement. In actual fact, between March and June 2007, a series of strikes broke out in Yantian, Shekou, Chiwan and many ports, causing nervousness within the upper layer of the Chinese ruling class. This appears to have been the prelude for the national wave of labour unrest that began in the Pearl River Delta area in 2010. The handling of the Yantian port strike of April 2007 was in reality a special exercise in “stability maintenance” for the party leadership in Shenzhen. The Municipal Committee Secretary and the Mayor each made their statements while the Deputy Mayor met with worker representatives face to face. All these had nothing to do with the power of collective bargaining by unions, nor to do with the superiority of Chinese socialism. Li Ka-Shing and his ilk know that a favourable investment environment in China is dependent on the stability maintained by the authoritarian government. These imperious capitalists are picking up on the fact that they could ill afford to be as callous as they have long been towards the Hong Kong working public when dealing with the industrial working class in the mainland that are launching strikes fiercer by the day.

Thirdly, although Hong Kong workers enjoy basic freedoms and rights to a degree, labour struggle in Hong Kong has long been in the doldrums. There, bourgeois institutions have layered obstacles to the exercising of striking and union rights by workers. Examples include court injunctions, stricter legal procedures, unions that are divided, and a developed system of replacing striking workers with scabs. These were some of the actual means employed to counter and dissolve the Hong Kong port strike this year.

Although mainland workers lack the protection provided by basic freedoms and rights, they are not faced with the same obstacles. There are no existing anti-strike laws and judgements. Neither are there unions and reformist organisations that infiltrate deep into the labour struggle and divide the working class. Due to the massive supply of cheap labour and high-turnover employment practices, businesses rarely use scabs to break strikes as they typically end after a few days. Typically, they would either dole out crumbs to break a strike, or give large concessions that rapidly end one.

What are the implications of the aforementioned differences? What are the problems faced by Yantian and Kwai Tsing port workers? How could their respective strengths complement each other? I have a few preliminary thoughts below.

First, the success of the 800 permanent dockers at Yantian compared to their Hong Kong counterparts is not a cause for foolish self-congratulations. We need to be sober and level-headed: there are 2,500 subcontracted workers apart from these permanent workers. So far, the struggle for equal-work-equal-pay at Yantian has yet to begin. Yet, the provision of higher wages and benefits to senior workers has historically been the strategy to maintain exploitative conditions, and to divide and contain worker revolts. From this angle, despite with a participation count of four to five hundred at the Hong Kong strike, its call for wage increase focused on equal treatment of outsourced workers reflects a more sensitive and profound working class demand. This was why it resonated and gathered passionate support from rank-and-file workers of other industries (particularly construction, housekeeping and other service businesses).

Today, besides Shenzhen and Hong Kong, places all over the country are seeing the majority of workers engaged in port work and increasingly other professions being employed under subcontractors. Given this, the demand for equal pay for equal work has significant potential to gather broader participation in collective struggle. Port workers employed by HIT number 3500, 2000+ of which are subcontracted (more than half). At the Shenzhen Yantian port, in contrast, workers total 3300, three quarters of which are subcontracted (about 2500) from over 20 companies. The strikes of April 2007 and September 2013 were both initiated by the comparatively fewer and better paid permanent workers. Due to the uneven playing field, subcontracted workers face greater difficulties in starting a strike. If the problem with the 40 day port strike in Hong Kong lies in the lower mobilisation figure of 400 subcontracted workers, not even 1/7 of the total worker population there, then, despite Yantian’s count of 800 strike participants, they were all (senior) permanent workers with better protection and comprised only a quarter of the total number of workers.

The Hong Kong port strike was conducted by a group of lower status workers in the same profession demanding equal and better pay, following the great tide in mainland China in recent years where the dual demands of wage increase and equality are increasingly being made (especially by dispatched labour, which include rural power workers). Truth be told, this contains broader and more enlightening significance than the single-minded demand for wage increase by regular employees. Sooner or later, the subcontracted workers at Yantian port (whose numbers triple that of regular employers) must make their move and continue down the path their Hong Kong counterparts has opened up – demanding pay increase and pay equality for equal work, a complete end to the system of subcontracting, and rights to self organisation and collective bargaining – so as to secure the future.

Further, the weakness of Hong Kong labour lies in its high degree of fragmentation induced by the capitalist system as well as its vulnerability to cheap labour used by mainland capitalists to suppress resistance. Although the movement in spring enjoyed mass support, the prolonged trough of activity has kept Hong Kong labour weak.

In view of the highly integrated capitalist economies of Mainland China and Hong Kong, Hong Kong labour movements must play a supportive role to their mainland counterparts. The two must unite as one for the sake of a bright future. To give a tiny example: many big brands from Hong Kong have retained only their headquarters and retail bases in the city; they operate super sweatshop plants unrestrainedly in the Pearl River Delta where workers labour under rampant exploitation. Nearly a decade ago, when cadmium poisoned female workers at Gold Peak Group’s subsidiary battery plants in Huizhou crossed the border to seek support from labour organisations in Hong Kong, cross-border alliances were a rare thing. Today, there is greater collaboration between the Hong Kong labour community and workers and organisations in the mainland. This has facilitated the struggle for labour rights.

However, the port strikes have revealed the strength of Hong Kong’s fundamental freedoms (i.e. it enabled workers and supporters to maintain a 40 day long struggle that provided room for effective organising), exactly where struggles by mainland workers fall short (i.e. easily repressed and killed off; struggles against exploitation often end in just a few days, and often without any result). So far, leftist comrades seem unwilling to admit or have difficulty comprehending that this is a major shortcoming of mainland workers. Due to the comparatively fewer number of direct actions, the instrumentality of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong and Taiwan is rarely highlighted. Furthermore, reformist unions fashioned after the West regularly compromise and sell workers out. Despite the determination of many workers to continue the fight and possibly roping in more people, the union leadership adopted a “know when to stop” attitude and hurriedly ended the strike in early May, betraying its worker-centric roots and flushed the efforts of many down the drain. However the fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong and Taiwan (especially the former) are deformed, heavily circumscribed and excised. The resort to strikes has little to do with the existence of fundamental freedoms or difficulty of struggle, and more to do with drive and momentum (for example, rapid growth in corporate profits that have not brought higher wages, and galvanisation by raises elsewhere in the same profession and industry). The protection of these basic rights are also won by worker struggles and beneficial to further struggles.

Of the fundamental freedoms, the right to strike, freedom of association, and media publishing are most important to workers. As workers in mainland China do not yet enjoy these rights, labour groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan that do to a considerable degree could link up more extensively with mainland workers to broadcast their voices, establish platforms, organise, and spur new ideas. For example, the subcontracted workers at Yantian may have greater grievances that we (in the mainland) cannot hear them as their voices are buried by big dailies full of praise for the regular Yantian port workers. Members of the Hong Kong-based Facebook group “Port Grievances”could perhaps visit Yantian to interview and link up with port workers there and work towards an “all on the same ocean” alliance between the two areas.

Finally, those passionately involved in labour organising and genuine leftists should be especially wary of the pseudo-leftist discourse of ‘maintaining stability’ of the state bureaucracy (e.g. published by the major dailies) and the political duplicity of web brigades (trolls and their ilk) that lauds the superiority of mainland workers in order to denigrate Hong Kong and Taiwan labour and divide everyone. For this reason, there needs to be greater emphasis on the cooperation between workers in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China to resist big capital (the state bourgeoisie have long colluded with private capitalists from both sides of the border). We should not leave the divisiveness between workers from the two sides to fester or indulge in one-upsmanship and allow ourselves to forget the common enemy riding on our backs.

9 September 2013

前不久(2013年9月1-2日)深圳盐田港800名塔吊龙门吊司机罢工要求 涨薪,仅两天的斗争就获得了1700元加薪(涨幅30%),不少评论者把这一胜利结果对比今年春季同属李嘉诚和黄旗下HIT持续长达40天的香港葵涌码头 工潮之挫败(加薪9.8%远不及23%的最初要求,称为“盐田胜利,香港失败”),赞扬内地工人的斗争水平更高一筹,或促香港工人反思抗争。深港两例罢工 的对比,实在充满象征意味,在当下社会日益敏感时刻,自然引人注目、各种富有想像力的宏大解读不难做出。但从工人争取更多果实与斗争经验的角度看,两起罢 工的差异更有趣,更值得劳工界的思考。(我编了个盐田港罢工资料小集[1],供参考)
不过,应该注意到深港码头罢工的根本差异:香港码头罢工最多就涵盖了 400-450名外判工,和黄称这些工人属于“非核心职位”——这可能是说码头上的外判工更容易被替换掉;而半年后的深圳盐田港罢工是800名直属工,大 多有十年以上工龄,可谓盐田港集团的中流砥柱。两个罢工的发起人群并不是一类工人,这就不宜简单地引申解读。
第一,9月1日盐田港工人自发聚集、不到24小时之内迅速聚集800名工人罢 工、竟致所有箱船作业全部停工,而且一开始就要求涨薪3000元(涨幅60%!)也很震撼人心,集体行动的规模和冲击力都大为强过始于3月28日的葵青港 罢工——职工盟组织的200名外判工首先起来罢工(另说只是150人),次日才扩展为约300人。相比之下盐田罢工自发冲劲显然更大,(在资本家看来)难 以管控预防。这些也是国内工人抗争的普遍特点。
关键利害在于:葵青港罢工在瘫痪码头运作方面不太得力。他们只瘫痪了一个6号 码头,4月1日后还退出了码头、退到闸外马路上罢工,参与人数也始终在300-450之间,这根本受限于香港主流工会的一些改良主义弊病:例如职工盟不以 争取更多工人参与为根本的社运化路线、四分五裂(码头工人分属三大工会)以及相互牵制。
港资的骄横跋扈及港府的傲慢,源于过去二三十年间香港充当了大陆资本主义复辟 的桥头堡,资本飞速膨胀,依仗大陆极权政府得以雇佣内地大量“廉价劳动力”、顺带压制了香港工人的工资要求。与此同时,劳工密集的大工业陆续外迁,物流运 输业、建筑业、服务业工人被层层外包宰制、陷入零散化,工运多年疲软不振。
其实,李嘉诚为代表的香港资本在深圳盐田港同样蛮横专制,但盐田港并非李氏独 占,而是和记黄埔与大陆官僚资本合作经营,前者占股65%,过去长期主导控制码头。大陆方面的合作方资本家还吐过槽:2007年4月盐田港罢工时,和黄一 直持消极态度,大陆方面才不得不出手解决,实际上就是政府方面(再加上工会这个半官方的机构)大力协调疏导[2]。2007年以后,盐田港的大陆合作方 (国企,幕后就是政府)也就掌握了协调劳资关系的实权,2011年时值汪洋主政的广东省高调吹嘘“社会建设”之后,更是再度热捧当年盐田港的“集体谈 判”,把它当成广东劳资关系领域“社会创新”的先行案例。显然合作方大陆政府比港资更积极对待工人抗议,这次罢工仅两日就达成妥协,比上次的三天解决还要 快。
为什么同一个李老板,在香港极强硬,在一水之隔的盐田港却会让步于大陆合作 方、更多让利给工人?笔者以为,发生在极为重要的国际港口的罢工(盐田港早已是中国货运吞吐量最大的集装箱港区),不仅损害内地政府的国际政治形象,而且 国内社会近数年来日益像濒临大爆炸的高压锅,这样背景下在要害枢纽发生罢工,一旦传染后果难料,例如可能激发沿海其他港口工人抗争,乃至与沿海工业区的劳 资冲突火花连成一片阶级斗争火海。实际上2007年3-6月深圳盐田、蛇口、赤湾等多个港口就发生一系列罢工潮,曾引起天朝统治阶级高层的高度紧张,这似 乎就是2010年春夏发端于珠三角的全国工潮的小范围预演,到了2011年上海集装箱卡车司机大罢工,带来了一个更大范围的沿海工潮[3]。2007年4 月盐田港罢工时其实是被深圳市党政领导班子当成政治维稳大事特事特办,市委书记和市长纷纷做重要批示、副市长亲自面见工人代表、谈话[4],这既不是“工 会集体协商”的神威,更不是特色社会主义的优越性。李嘉诚们深知,他们在大陆的“良好投资环境”有赖于大陆极权统治的基本稳定,这些不可一世的大资本家也 逐渐懂得,面对自发抗争越发激烈的国内产业工人阶级,不能像在长期惯于忍受的香港劳动大众中那样肆无忌惮。
第三,香港工人虽有一定程度的基本自由权利,但长期的抗争低迷,也使整个资产 阶级社会体制早已层层建构了阻拦工人利用罢工权、工会权的障碍:例如禁制令之类的法规、严格的法院程序,四分五裂的工会,还有临时替换罢工工人的成熟的工 贼制度。今年香港码头罢工,资方正是充分运用了这些手段消解、反制罢工。
内地工人缺乏基本自由权利的保障,却也因此没有这些障碍,既没有打压罢工的法 规、法院判决,也没有深入抗争分裂工人的工会或其他改良主义机构;由于庞大的“廉价劳力供给”和高度流动性的用工体制,资方倒也很少用工贼反制罢工,通常 是很快几天就结束罢工,要么施以小恩小惠再粉碎罢工,要么大幅退让迅速收场。
首先,对于相比香港外判工更为成功争取了自身利益的深圳盐田港800名正式 工,我们内地的工人群众和劳工界不应傻逼呵呵地沾沾自喜,必须清醒、冷静地正视:在这些正式工身边的“同一海上”,还有约2500名承包商工人(即外判 工),争取同工同酬的抗争潮流仍然没有在盐田码头上打开局面。而制造工人分化、巩固老技术工的较高薪资福利,却历来是资产阶级维持压榨秩序、分化牵制工人 反抗的重要计策。从这个角度说,尽管至多只有四五百人参与,香港码头上争取加薪、同时着重争取劳动待遇平等的外判工抗争,却仍然喊出了更敏感、更深刻层次 的工人阶级需求,这是它引起香港其他行业(尤其建筑业、家政服务及其他服务业)基层工人共鸣、热烈支持的根本原因。
如今,无论深港乃至国内其他地方,码头以及其他越来越多行业的多数工人沦落到 外判商(承包商)手中,同工同酬诉求具有了争取大多数工人加入集体抗争的特殊重大意义。香港HIT旗下码头工人共有3500人,外判工2000多人(占半 数多)。但在深圳盐田港,总计约3300名工人中却更有3/4(约2500人)是承包商工人,分属多达20几个承包商;可是2007年4月和2013年9 月的两次罢工,都是由较少数、薪酬较高的正式工发起,承包商工人更难发动抗争,不在同一水平上。其实2007年3月24日盐田港的一个承包商“利成富”货 柜服务公司的船舶理货工人也发起过罢工,但却没了下文(没报道结果也没听说新的抗争、近年倒是有揭露承包商工人不平等遭遇的博文[5]),只有正式工六年 来成功发起了两次罢工。如果说今年40天香港码头工潮的问题在于只动员了400多外判工、不足所在码头工人的1/7,那么虽然盐田港更多的800名工人起 来抗争,但他们却全都只是较有保障的正式工(老技工)、也只是所在码头的那1/4。
香港码头罢工是一群同行业相对更低下的工人争取平等、同时争取加薪的抗争,这 与内地近几年来越来越多争取加薪和平等并举的伟大潮流是一致的(尤其是近年来国内劳务派遣工人、包括农电工争取同工同酬的斗争)。实事求是地说,这比一群 已经较有保障的技术工单纯争取加薪,更有广泛启发意义。以此来看,盐田港更多过正式工两倍以上的承包商工人迟早要动起来,而且他们也只有继续香港外判工抗 争已经开启的思路——要求加薪及同工同酬、大胆要求结束外判承包体制(即争取一次性全部转正[6])、大胆争取自我组织及集体谈判权——才能杀出一条出路 来。
从越发高度融合的陆港资本主义经济看,香港工运必须作为内地工运的辅助、联合 为一个整体才能有光辉前途。举一个小小的例子:很多香港的大资本品牌商只留总部和销售基地在香港,却放任在珠三角大量超级血汗代工工厂的超级剥削压榨,近 十年前港资金山集团的惠州超霸电池厂镉中毒女工赴港寻求工运团体联合抗争,还是稀罕事,如今已有比较多的香港工运界与内地抗争工人、劳工机构合作,促进工 人维权。
但是,码头工潮显示了香港基本自由权利的长处(支持斗争长达40天之久、使得 工人和支持者能够有效组织运作),这正好对应了大陆工人斗争的缺点(工代核心易被打压瓦解、多数日常反剥削斗争几天就完、易无果而终[7])。很多左翼朋 友似乎至今不愿承认、或难以理解这是大陆工人的一大缺点。这里就多讲几句:基本自由权利在港台工运确实远远没有充分彰显作用,原因在于港台工人较少发生直 接行动,也就较少利用到那些基本自由权利,同时港台存在着与西方类似的改良主义工会,惯于妥协和叛卖,5月初码头工潮的收场就是职工盟领导者自以为“见好 就收”的匆忙妥协下场,实际上很多工人还有决心坚持下去、还可能争取更多工人投入罢工,但职工盟抛弃以工人为重心的斗争路线导致工友前功尽弃。而且基本自 由权利在港台、尤其在香港是残缺的,受到重重限制分割。至于工人诉诸直接行动的多少,并不主要因为自由权利的有无、斗争的难易,而是工人斗争自身的动力所 致(例如快速的企业利润增长没有带来工资提高、同行业或同地区工资增长的激发[8])。但是基本自由权利的保障,既是(也必定是)工人自觉争取来的,也极 有利进一步斗争。
基本自由权利中对工人最重要的是罢工权、结社权和新闻出版权。在目前内地工人 还没争取到的情况下,已经具有这方面相当程度权利的港台工运,可以更广泛、自觉地结合内地工人斗争,帮助内地工人发声、建立平台、组织核心、启发思想。比 如说,盐田港的承包商工人很可能积怨至今更大,但是我们内地工人都听不到他们的发声,他们的诉苦也被掩盖在大公报之流对盐田正式工的溢美之词背后,“码头 的辛酸”的伙计们能不能到盐田港走访问候,两地同行联谊、为争取更大范围“同一海上”的共同劳权携手努力?
最后,一切工运热心者和真诚的左翼分子都应该特别警惕——大陆官僚资产阶级的 假左维稳舆论(如大公报之流)及其网特(如搅屎分子之流)的政治诡计:挟内地工人之优势,极尽贬损港台工运,离间两岸三地工人。那么就更应该强调港台和内 地工人合作互补、联合反抗大资本压迫的思路,(大陆官僚资产阶级早就跟境内外私人资本巨头深度勾结),而不是放任工人两边继续分立隔绝、或者只想比个高下 却忽略了骑在我们头上的大资本敌人。港陆工人都各有显著的长短处,都面临形式不同的、但都相当严重的被压迫困境,包括深港的珠三角工人有着越来越多的相似 境遇、共同利益,两地工运界也越来越多合作,再加上近年来两地工运都迫切需要刷新,“陆港工运是一家”正当其时。
[3]深圳市的工会官僚王同信曾在2007年底一个精英讨论会上说:“今年(2007年)三月以来,深圳港口发生的一系列罢工,及其处理。三月开始,到六 月,先后六次。其激烈程度、所涉及人数、引起的广泛反响,是大家不能理解的。它到目前为止,结束了吗?好象还没。……盐田国际停工一天,涉及十万人,更不 要说间接的了。各方面都很重视。市总工会第一次就由我们牵头处理,是史前没有的,在维稳事件中,都是政府出面。由工会出面协调、协商,创造了一个新模式。 我们的总结已得到王兆国同志的批示。随后,我们专门成立了机构。”
[6]争取一次性全部转正、签订永久合同,这似乎有点“天方夜谭”,但是在大规模抗争下这仍然是有可能的。2012年国际工运就有几个例子:2012年 10月印尼200万人大罢工,反对外判制度,迫使不少老板签订永久合同。在埃及苏克哈纳,2012年二月杜拜环球港口有1200名工人罢工十六天,最后成 功争取全部由外判工转成直接聘用。

Translators’ notes:


  1. For more information in English on the Hong Kong port strike of 2013, see “Interview with leader of Hong Kong dockers” by Stephen Philion. A report based on interviews with other participants is forthcoming.
  2. Footnotes omitted from the translation.


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